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I.

Introduction

Under the rubric of “consumer-driven health care,” insurers, employers,
and policy-makers are experimenting with new types of health insurance
products, namely “high deductible health plans” (“HDHPs”). HDHPs allow
consumers to purchase health insurance with deductibles that might range from
$1000-$5000 for individuals and $2500-$10,000 for families1 (and can reach
even higher amounts if not coupled with federal tax incentives). A deductible is
defined as the amount that the insured individual must pay for medical costs
before the insurance company is required to pay for the costs of health care.2

1

26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(A).

2

There are exceptions where the insurance companies will provide “first-dollar coverage” for preventive
care (Id. at § 223(c)(2)(C)) which will be discussed below, infra Section II.

1

While federal tax law provides tax exemptions to promote such plans by allowing
consumers to couple them with health savings accounts (“HSAs”), their existence
does not depend on the federal tax law nor on consumers’ choice to fund the
HSAs.3 Rather, the growing trend in the insurance market to offer HDHPs
reflects a reality that is less about consumer choice and more about consumer
risks.4 HDHPs represent yet one more market reaction to run-away health care
costs and can best be described as the “hot potato” approach to health care
spending: Pass along the risks of the high costs associated with constantly rising
health care spending increases to consumers without addressing the underlying
causes of health care inflation.5
As these products appear, it is critical that we understand that as much as
the rhetoric focuses on expanding consumer choices, the appearance of HDHPs
on the market actually narrows and obscures not only consumer choices but the
ability to pursue sound policy in this area. Moreover, they are creating risks in a
regulatory vacuum. This article sets out a two-fold framework for addressing the
3

In fact, 90% of consumers electing HDHPs who have the option of funding an HSA have failed to do so.
Paul Fronstin & Sara Collins, “Early Experience With High-Deductible and Consumer-Driven Health
Plans: Findings from the EBRI/Commonwealth Fund Consumers in Health Care Survey,” EBRI Issue
Brief No. 288 (Dec. 2005) at 5 (www.ebri.org).

4

See Wendy Mariner, “Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients?”, 69 Brook. L.Rev. 485 (Winter
2004) at 541: “Consumer-choice plans shift responsibility for saving the system money from employers
and insurers onto consumers…” See also, id., at 507, referring to Alain Enthoven’s dismissal of
“consumer-choice” plans as a euphemism for “ordinary health insurance with a high deductible” (citing
Alain C. Enthoven, “Employment-Based Health Insurance is Failing: Now What,” Health Affairs, May 28,
2003, at W3-239 at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.237v1.pdf); and Karen Davis,
Michelle Doty, and Alice Ho, “How High is Too High? Implications of High-Deductible Health Plans,”
The Commnwealth Fund Pub. No. 816 at 16: “The major effect of a high deductible is likely to be a onetime shift in spending from premiums to patient out-of-pocket outlays. Premiums to employers and
workers would be reduced by 10 to 15 percent … but most of that reduction would be a reduction in
covered medical outlays and a shift to out-of-pocket expenses for which patients would be responsible.”
5

See, generally, John V. Jacobi, “Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill,” 38 Univ. of
Michigan J. of L. Ref. (Spring 2005) at 535-547 for a discussion of the market-based reforms that have
substituted for systemic policy yet have failed to constrain costs or stem the rise in the uninsured.
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rhetoric versus the reality of consumer choice in this area. First, after describing
the types of products and the experience to date, this article will address three
fundamental myths that are promoted by the proponents of such plans: 1) the
myth of discretionary health care spending; 2) the myth of discretionary income
for health care spending; and 3) the myth of consumer power to negotiate over
and make an impact on the costs of health care. In fact, this article will discuss
a fourth myth that is not so much promoted by HDHP proponents as presumed:
consumer choice over the selection of health insurance products and over how
their collective risks are “pooled.” Confronting these myths is critical to
understanding why consumers require protection. If HDHPs are allowed to be
marketed freely without addressing the myriad risks they pose to consumers,
consumers will become increasingly “under-insured,” meaning that despite
having insurance, they will be faced with health care costs they cannot afford;
and increasingly uninsurable, meaning that as consumers develop health care
problems, the only products left to cover them will themselves be unaffordable.
Therefore, the second part of this article will propose model regulatory solutions
to protect consumers from the risks actually posed by these plans.

II.

Background

The term “HDHPs” will be used broadly to refer to any plans that offer
“high deductibles” which, for the purpose of this article, will include any amount

3

higher than $1000.6 They have emerged in part as a result of federal tax
exemptions for HSAs but in reality, can be and are marketed separate and apart
from such HSAs. Nevertheless, this article will first describe the basic structure
under federal law. In 2003, Congress adopted the Medicare Modernization Act
which added section 223 to the Internal Revenue Code7 in order to promote the
marketing of HDHPs by offering tax benefits for contributions and earnings on
Health Savings Accounts.8 The basic structure is that consumers may establish
HSAs with pre-tax income and can use savings in the HSAs to meet qualified
health care expenses without paying a tax on the funds spent.9 However, HSAs
only can be offered if the employee has elected to use the funds in conjunction
with an HDHP that meets the federal legal requirements and that is the only type
of health insurance being used by the consumer.10 Specifically, the minimum
and maximum deductible amounts under the federal law are: $1000-$5000 for

6

While the federal law provides minimum and maximum amounts, there are no consistent definitions
under state law.

7

26 U.S.C. § 223. These built on the experience of prior “Archer” medical savings accounts which were
limited in scope and have been phased out. See Amy Monahan, “The Promise and Peril of Ownership
Society Health Care Policy,” 80 Tulane L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006) at fn. 11.

8

26 U.S.C. §§ 233(e)-(f). Timothy Jost and Mark Hall have noted that this legislation is one of the major
federal health policy initiatives of our time, and as such, is a unique exercise of “federalism” in the health
care arena: The law neither compels states to require insurers to offer these products nor does it prohibit
states from blocking such products; rather, “[i]t simply makes it clear that states that prohibit such policies
will deprive their residents of access to a generous federal tax subsidy.” Timothy Jost & Mark Hall, “The
Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health Care,” 31 Am. J. L. & Med. 395, 400 (2005).

9

26 U.S.C. §§ 233(e)-(f). Employees who are offered HDHPs at work are eligible to have employers also
contribute amounts to the HSAs. Id. at § 223(a) (contributions may come from others on “behalf” of the
taxpayer); see also Internal Revenue Bulletin 2004-2 (Jan. 12, 2004), “Health Savings Accounts,” at Q-ll
(http://www.irs.gov/irb/2004-02_IRB/ar09.html).

10

26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(1). There are exceptions for insurance for accidents, disability, dental care, vision
care, and long-term care. Id. at § 223(c)(1)(B).
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individuals and $2500-$10,000 for families.11 These amounts are amounts that
consumers will pay toward their health care that is additional to the amounts
charged for the premiums, and once insurance kicks in, additional to the amounts
charged for “cost-sharing” in the form of either co-payments or percentages of
charges.
There are a couple exceptions to the basic structure. First, insurance
companies may exclude certain preventive care expenses12 from the deductible
which means that the insurance company actually will provide coverage for such
amounts even if the deductible is not met (referred to as “first dollar coverage”).
First dollar coverage for preventive care, however, is not mandatory; i.e., it is at
the plan’s discretion whether to exempt preventive care from the deductible
amounts.13 In fact, IRS interpretation of federal law states that there will be no
deference to state law that requires insurance companies to provide first dollar
coverage for certain types of care that are broader than the narrow federal
definition of preventive care.14

11

Id. at § 223(c)(2).

12

26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(C). Preventive care is defined as including but not being limited to: periodic
health evaluations, routine prenatal and well-child care, child and adult immunizations, tobacco cessation
programs, obesity weight-loss programs, and a variety of screening services for cancer, heart and vascular
diseases, infectious diseases, mental health conditions and substance abuse, metabolic, nutritional and
endocrine conditions, musculoskeletal disorders, ob/gyn conditions, pediatric conditions, and vision and
hearing disorders. Internal Revenue Bulletin 2004-15 (April 12, 2004), “Health Savings Accounts—
Preventive Care,” pp. 2-3 (http://www.irs.gov/irb/2004-15_IRB/ar10.html). However, preventive care does
not include any service or benefit intended to treat an existing illness, injury or condition. Id.
13

Internal Revenue Bulletin 2004-15 (id.) at 1.

14

Id. at 2. Note that federal guidelines provided a grace period which now has expired. See Internal
Revenue Bulletin 2004-27 (July 6, 2004) at 1 (expired Jan. 1, 2006) (http://www.irs.gov/irb/200427_IRB/ar13.html). At the same time, states still have the power to require plans marketing HDHPs to
exclude preventive care from the deductibles as long as it fits within the narrow federal definition.

5

Second, health insurance plans can limit what counts toward the
deductible; specifically, health insurance plans that provide coverage only if
“network” providers are used can choose not to count amounts actually
expended on health care to out-of-network providers toward the deductible. 15
Moreover, there is a lack of clarity in the federal law or IRS interpretations on the
issue of the insured’s financial exposure when using network providers: First,
there is no requirement that the favorable rates that insurers negotiate with
network providers are the rates that will be charged the insured; and second,
there is no requirement that if the insured is charged higher rates, the higher
charges will definitely count toward the deductible. For example, while this
Author is not enrolled in an HDHP, I recently received an Explanation of Benefits
form concerning a one-day hospitalization for my son who had broken his elbow.
The rate charged was close to $11,000 but the rate negotiated with my insurer
was $1,100. Let’s assume that I had been enrolled in an HDHP with a $10,000
deductible. It is not clear whether: 1) I would have had to pay up to $10,000 to
cover the charge or whether my exposure would be limited to the amount
negotiated with the insurer; and 2) whether, even if I spent up to the $10,000,
whether the amount that actually counted toward the deductible would be the
actual amount I spent rather than the negotiated amount of $1,100.
The scenario described above raises a further problem inherent in the
coupling of the HDHPs with the HSAs. Namely, there is no legal structure for
15

26 U.S.C. § 223(b)(2)(B); Internal Revenue Bulletin 2004-2, “Health Savings Accounts” (Jan. 12, 2004),
supra note 9 at Answer to Q-4. In an article by Hall & Havighurst, they applaud the idea of extending
managed care cost-controls to HDHPs but acknowledge that it is not required. See Mark Hall & Clark
Havighurst, “Reviving Managed Care With Health Savings Accounts,” Health Affairs: 24:6 (Nov./Dec.
2005) at 1490.

6

requiring coordination or consumer information about which expenses that can
be used from the HSAs actually count toward the deductibles.16 The federal law
requires only that HSAs be administered by either banks, insurance companies
or other qualified trustees17 and that, in fact, not even the administrators are
responsible for determining what actually counts for the federal tax exemption
since this is actually a tax benefit for which the taxpayer is responsible.18
Therefore, where health insurance plans maintain no responsibility for the HSAs,
consumers must be separately informed by the insurance plans whether
expenses incurred actually meet the deductible amounts. Notably, as with any
deductibles, the incentives clearly are directed against first dollar coverage by the
insurers.
Apart from the federal law, insurance companies have been launching
high deductible health insurance products to consumers, including both
employed consumers and individual consumers.19 For example, Blue Cross of

16

This is true for any out-of-pocket expenses, whether or not they come from an HSA. See also Hall &
Havighurst, id. at 1497-98, explaining that there are a variety of administrative possibilities for informing
consumers about which expenses count, including a retrospective review. Note that it is typical that
individuals without insurance pay higher rates for care because they don’t get the advantages of negotiated
rates by insurers who can guarantee a certain volume of business. See Elizabeth Pendo, “Images of Health
Insurance in Film: The Dissolving Critique,” 37 J. of Health L. 267, 282 (Spring 2004).
17

26 U.S.C. § 223(d)(B). In fact, banks and insurance companies are showing significant interest in
entering the market. See Eric Dash, “Savings Accounts for Health Costs Attract Wall St.” The New York
Times, (Jan. 27, 2006) at A-1.

18

Internal Revenue Bulletin 2004-2, supra note 9 at Answer to Q-29: “HSA trustees or custodians are not
required to determine whether HSA distributions are used for qualified medical expenses. Individuals who
establish HSAs make that determination and should maintain records of their medical expenses sufficient to
show that the distributions have been made exclusively for qualified medical expenses…”

19

See Daniel Costello, “A mini price, a mini policy,” L.A. Times (June 6, 2005) at F6; see also Kathy
Robertson, “Kaiser plans chase dwindling memberships: New high-deductible plans slash premiums,”
Sacramento Business Journal (May 12, 2004).

7

California has undertaken a very slick youth-oriented campaign toward individual
consumers (who are seeking a health insurance option outside the work-place)
which includes web-based information and applications called “Tonik.”20
According to its web advertisements, it is described as follows: “Health coverage
for your body, eyes, teeth. You know, the important stuff.”21 However, under the
section entitled “Compare Plans,” the following description was used: “Here it is.
Health insurance, straight up. Three plans. Same all-around coverage:
Preventive, Emergency, Rx, eyes, teeth (no maternity)” (emphasis added).22
The deductibles range from $1500-$5000, two of the plans limit the consumer to
4 doctor’s visits per year, and the premiums range from $64-$80 per month.23
This is clearly being marketed to the young, healthy, and male market without
chronic or intense care needs that they know about.24 If insurers seek to launch
HDHPs without HSAs, there is no federal law that puts a cap on the deductible
amounts or in any other way, places limits on the structure of the HDHPs. In
fact, as these insurance products illustrate, this trend is coupled with another
disturbing trend: not only will the cost-sharing go up but the insurance industry is

20

Tonik Health Insurance – Blue Cross of California (http://www.tonikhealth.com/ca).

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

E.g., can a person diagnosed with cancer limit himself to 4 doctor’s visits?
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marketing “diluted” insurance products that fail to cover comprehensive health
care needs.25
There is a growing national interest by employers and insurers to promote
HDHPs.26 According to a national survey of employed individuals, while only
10% of the respondents had elected an HDHP,27 enrollment is expected to grow
substantially in 2006.28 Apart from the ideological discussions which will be
discussed below, there is a clear need to bring down the costs of health
insurance premiums.29 Between 2000 and 2005, overall premiums for health
insurance increased a cumulative 73% while worker income increased only
15%.30 Indeed, not only are the premiums increasing, but also there is a trend to

25

Note the exclusion above of maternity care coverage and the limitations on doctors’ visits and hospital
care.

26

It also is a cornerstone of the current Republican agenda on health care as enunciated in President Bush’s
most recent “State of the Union” address. Robert Pear, “Health Care, Vexing to Clinton, Is Now at Top of
Bush’s Agenda,” The New York Times (Jan. 29, 2006) (“Mr. Bush has a fundamentally different
philosophy [from Mr. Clinton who favored a larger role for government], built on the idea that placing
more responsibility in the hands of individuals will create market pressures to hold down costs.”) President
Bush has used his State of the Union address in prior years also to discuss high deductible policies. Gail
Shearer, “Commentary – Defined Contribution Health Plans: Attracting the Healthy and Well-Off,” Health
Services Research 39:4, Part II at 1 (August 2004).

27

Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3 at 21.

28

Id. at 4, citing a survey by Mercer Human Resources Consulting which found that 73% of large
employers were very or somewhat likely to offer them in 2006. In California, 18% of employes offered
HDHPs in 2004 and the number is expected to increase to 33% by 2006. RAND, “’Consumer Directed’
Health Plans: Implications for Health Care Quality and Cost,” California Health Care Foundation Report at
6 (June 2005). At least 75 insurers offer HDHPs nationwide and they span all markets: 58 to large
employers, 56 to small employers, and 47 to individuals. It at 11-12. See also, “Savings Accounts for
Health Costs Attract Wall St.”, New York Times, 1/27/06, A-1 (citing a study that estimates that by 2010,
more than 15 million Americans, or about 10% of the insured, will have an HSA; the American Bankers
Assn. is calling it a “gold rush:”); in fact, both banks and insurers stand to profit by the development of
HSAs: “Banks make money each time a customer swipes his debit card at a doctors office” and “[the
insurers and the banks] split the money earned for opening and maintaining the accounts.” Id. at A-16.

29

See generally, Edward Larson & Marc Dettmann, “The Impact of HSAs on Health Care Reform:
Preliminary Results After One Year,” 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1087 (Winter 2005) at 1089-1092.

30

Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3 at 4.
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pass on more costs to employees irrespective of whether HDHPs are even
offered: employees are paying a higher percentage toward the premiums, copayments are increasing, and of course, the deductibles are increasing.31 The
growing number of “uninsured” are among working people who are offered health
insurance but decline to take it, many of whom do so because they cannot afford
the costs of the premiums.32 Ironically, the federal legislation promoting HSAs
provides its greatest value to those in the highest tax brackets even though they
have the least problems affording health insurance.33
HDHPs should be seen as part of a greater trend to lower premiums while
promoting an insurance product that might eventually be severed from

31

Id.; see also Jon Gabel, Gary Claxton, et al., “Health Benefits in 2003: Premium Reach Thirteen-Year
High as Employers Adopt New Forms of Cost Sharing,” Health Affairs: 22:5 (Sept./Oct. 2003) at 117.

32

See Todd Gilmer & Richard Kronick, “It’s the Premiums Stupid: Projections of the Uninsured Through
2013” Health Affairs Web Exclusive W5-143 (April 5, 2005) (the number of uninsured is projected to
increase by eleven million in the coming decade); Paul Fronstin, “Sources of Health Insurance and
Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2005 Current Population Survey,” EBRI Issue
Brief No. 287 (Nov. 2005) at 13 (among the 15.2 percent of uninsured workers eligible for health benefits
in 2002, nearly two-thirds reported they declined it because of the cost); and Daniel Costello, “At What
Cost?” L.A. Times (April 4, 2005) (to keep health coverage, more workers are cutting back on food, heat
and other necessities and still, “many of them eventually will lose the battle”).

33

As with any tax benefit, the higher the individual’s tax bracket, the greater the value of the savings to the
tax-payer. See Gail Shearer, “Commentary – Defined Contribution Health Plans: Attracting the Healthy
and Well-Off,” Health Services Research: 39:4, Part II at 1 (August 2004); see also Monahan, supra note 7
at 54: “The winners from the shift in tax policy are those with high incomes who receive the greatest tax
benefit from the ability to save for medical expenses on a pre-tax basis;” id. at fn 52, citing Stephen
Parente, Roger Feldman, and Jon Christianson, “Evaluation of the Effect of a Consumer-Driven Health
Plan on Medical Care Expenditures and Utilization,” Health Services Research, 39:4, Part II (August 2004)
at 1189, 1198: an examination of one large employer showed that the consumer driven health plans
attracted the highest percentage of employees from above the 75th percentile of income; GAO Report,
“Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: First-Year Experience with High-Deductible Health Plans
and Health Savings Accounts,” GAO-06-271 at 10 (January 2006) (43% of federal employees enrolled in
HDHPs had annual incomes above $75,000 compared to 23% for other plans); and RAND, “ConsumerDirected Health Plans: Implications for Health Care Quality and Cost,” California Health Care Foundation,
June 2005 at 13 (people with higher incomes will view the HSAs as investment tools).

10

employment altogether.34 Interestingly, among consumers choosing HDHPs,
only 10% are funding the HSAs,35 suggesting that the attractiveness may not so
much be the tax benefit but the lowered premium costs. By shifting more costs
to the consumer, the actual value of health insurance may actually be diminishing
to something akin to “catastrophic coverage” and could prove an attractive
alternative to those individuals for whom work-place insurance is too expensive.
Unfortunately, this shift to consumers of increased risks for the costs of
medical care is occurring even when analysts are discovering that medical debt
is the leading cause of consumer bankruptcies.36 Alongside the 45 million
Americans without health insurance is emerging the growing class of “underinsured” Americans: individuals who have purchased health insurance that is
ineffective in both protecting them from financial catastrophe and from ensuring

34

There are a variety of theories as to why insurance ultimately may be severed from employment.
Compare Mariner, “Can Consumer Choice Plans Satisfy Consumers,” supra note 4 at 511 with Alain
Enthoven, “Employment-Based Health Insurance is Failing: Now What?” Health Affairs Web Exclusive
W3-237 (May 21, 2003). Despite powerful federal tax incentives that apply to employment-based health
insurance (see Monahan, “The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care Policy,” supra note 7
at 2), there is a growing interest in promoting more affordable premiums on the individual market with tax
incentives of their own. See Robert Pear, supra note 26 (President Bush advocates for not “favoring”
employment-based insurance with tax breaks unavailable on the individual market or for small businesses
wishing to “band together.”)

35

EBRI Issue Brief (fn #23 above) at 5; see also id. at 13: (individuals with HDHPs reported a variety of
reasons for not funding the HSAs but 30% reported they did not have the money); see also Claxton &
Gabel, et al. “What High Deductible Plans Look Like: Findings from a National Survey of Employers,
2005,” Health Affairs Web Exclusive (Sept. 14, 2005) (one-third of employers do not contribute to the
HSAs).

36

David Himmelstein, Elizabeth Warren, Deborah Thorne & Steffie Woolhandler, “MarketWatch: Illness
and Injury As Contributors to Bankruptcy,” Health Affairs, Feb. 2, 2005. This data has been disputed by a
recent analysis funded by “America’s Health Insurance Plans.” See David Dranove and Michael
Millenson, “Medical Bankruptcy: Myth Versus Fact,” Health Affairs Web Abstract (Feb. 28, 2006) and
subsequent response by the original authors (Himmelstein, et al.), “Discounting the Debtors Will Not Make
Medical Bankruptcy Disappear,” Health Affairs Web Abstract (Feb. 28, 2006).

11

access to timely and necessary medical care.37 According to a national survey
evaluating the impact of HDHPs, 42% of consumers in HDHPs spent 5% or more
of their income on their health care as compared with 12% of individuals in
comprehensive health plans.38 In other words, individuals in HDHPs were almost
3-1/2 times more likely to spend a substantial portion of their income on their
health care, although the plans are most heavily marketed to individuals who
take the risk that they will not have substantial health care expenses.39 In fact,
about one-third of individuals in HDHPs reported delaying or avoiding care due to
the costs.40 Ironically, it is the insured through their health care premiums who
pay the price for the uninsured or the underinsured who cannot pay their bills: it

37

See John Leland, “When Even Health Insurance is No Safeguard,” The New York Times A-1;
Himmelstein, Warren, et al., “Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy,” supra note … ; Melissa
Jacoby, “The Debtor-Patient,” 69 Brook. L.Rev. 453 (Winter 2004); and Cathy Schoen, Michelle Doty,
Sara Collins, and Alyssa Holmgren, “Insured But Not Protected: How Many Adults Are Underinsured?”
Health Affairs Web Exclusive, June 14, 2005 (underinsured adults are almost as likely at the uninsured to
go without needed medical care and to incur medical debt; those with greatest risk of being “underinsured”
are those with lower incomes and those who are sicker; “underinsured adults” are defined as having
insurance that provides inadequate financial protection as indicated by one of the following three
conditions: 1) annual out-of-pocket medical expenses amount to 10% or more of income; 2) among lowincome adults with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty level, out-of-pocket medical expenses
amount to 5% or more of income; or 3) health plan deductibles equal or exceed 5% of income) .

38

Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3 at 13.

39

There is a contrast between individuals who choose HDHPs who are employed and those who buy them
on the individual market. Among individuals who purchase them on the individual market, 60% report
being in excellent or very good health versus 47% who purchase HDHP at work. Id. at 6. Note, however,
that 51% of individuals who purchase them at work do not have a choice of another health plan offered to
them. Id. At 9. See also, Laura Tollen, Murray Ross & Stephen Poor, “Risk Segmentation Related to the
Offering of a Consumer-Directed Health Plan: A Case Study of Humana, Inc.” Health Services Research
39:4, Part II (Aug. 2004) (concluding that offering a high deductible plan alongside more traditional
options caused risk segmentation within an employer group).
40

Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3 at 15.
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has been estimated that health insurance premiums in 2005 increased on
average $922 due to the cost of health care for the uninsured.41

III.

Deconstructing the myths

The purported advantage of “consumer-directed health care,” its principal
feature being high deductibles, is that it addresses what is called the “moral
hazard” in health care spending.42 The term “moral hazard” is used to refer to
the fact that an individual is likely to incur greater costs when someone else is
financially responsible. This has been the basis for criticizing the consumer’s
role in contributing to rising health care costs in this country. As currently
structured, the demand and the cost of health care are driven largely by the
health care providers. Insurers pay the amounts charged while consumers’ costs
are negligible. The insurers then pass along the increases through the premiums
charged which are paid mostly by the employers, and the employers’ costs are
heavily subsidized by the federal government through the tax code.43 No party

41

Families USA, “Paying a Premium: The Added Cost of Care for the Uninsured,” (June 2005), p. 2
(Report written by Kathleen Stoll, Director of Health Policy, Families USA; data analysis provided by
Kenneth Thorpe, Robert W. Woodruff Professor and Chair of the Department of Health Policy &
Management, Rollins School of Public Health, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia); see also The Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, “The Uninsured: A Primer, Key Facts About Americans
Without Health Insurance” (Jan. 2006) at 9 (the costs of uncompensated care are estimated to be about $41
billion in 2004).

42

See Deborah Stone, “Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity,” 6 Conn. Ins. L. J. 12
(Fall 1999) at 12 note 1; Malcolm Gladwell, “The Moral Hazard Myth,” The New Yorker (Aug. 29, 2005)
at 44, 46; and Andre Hampton, “Markets, Myths, and a Man on the Moon: Aiding and Abetting America’s
Flight from Health Insurance,” 52 Rutgers L. Rev. 987 (Summer 2000).

43

See Larson & Dettmann, supra note 29 at 1091-1092; Amy Monahan, supra note 7 at 7-8 and 20-22; and
Alain Enthoven and Richard Kronick, “A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 1990s,” The New England
J. of Medicine (Vol. 320, No. 1) (Jan. 5, 1989) at 29 (noting the open-ended sources of financing of health
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who actually has control over the costs has an incentive to minimize them while
those parties who could benefit from cost-containment have minimal
opportunities to exercise such control. Managed care was an experiment to
place more risk and control on the providers themselves.44 For a variety of
reasons, and depending on your perspective, the “experiment” of managed care
as an effective mechanism to control costs and offset the “moral hazard” is being
either abandoned or augmented by the movement toward consumer-driven
health care.45
Consumer-driven health care, then, places a greater burden on the
consumer for taking on the expense of health care. However, there are three
myths perpetuated by its proponents which must be addressed: 1) the myth of
discretionary health care spending; 2) the myth of discretionary income for health

care where costs are passed along to players without an incentive to control cost resulting in a uniquely
American paradox of excess (high inflation and profits) and deprivation (growing numbers of uninsured)).
44

See Thomas Rice, “Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?” Journal of Health Politics,
Policy & Law 22:2 at 383, pp. 415-418. For a thoughtful critique of how managed care failed to live up to
its expectations, see John Jacobi, “After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and Consumerism,” 47 St.
Louis U. L. J. 397 (Spring 2003), pp. 399-400 (arguing that managed care had become a “classic black
box.” “We asked managed care to work private sector magic on problems that had bedeviled government.
As with sausage making and the passage of laws, we were too often happy not to be exposed to the precise
mechanisms by which managed care controlled utilization of health care.”)

45

For a thoughtful summary, see John Jacobi, “Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill,” 38
University of Michigan J. of Law Reform 531 (Spring 2005) at 539-542; and for different perspectives, see
Carl Ameringer, “Devolution and Distrust: Managed Care and the Resurgence of Physician Power and
Authority,” 5 DePaul J. Health Care L. 187 (2002); Cara Lesser, Paul Ginsburg, and Kelly Devers, “The
End of an Era: What Became of the ‘Managed Care Revolution’ in 2001?” Health Services Research 38:1,
Part II at 337 (Feb. 2003); Rick Mayes, “Medicare and America’s Healthcare System in Transition: From
the Death of Managed Care to the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and Beyond,” 38 J. of Health L.
391 (Summer 2005); and M. Gregg Bloche, “One Step Ahead of the Law: Market Pressure and the
Evolution of Managed Care,” The Privatization of Health Law Reform (M. Gregg Bloche, Ed.) (2003). But
see Hall & Havighurst, supra note 15 , arguing against the idea that consumer driven health care and
managed care are antithetical but rather, advocating for a synergy whereby cost-consciousness and
discipline are exercised equally between consumers on the demand side and managed care on the supply
side.

14

care spending; and 3) the myth of consumer power to negotiate over and make
an impact on the costs of health care.

A. The Myth of Discretionary Health Care Spending

Consumer-driven health care proponents believe that increasing
consumer sensitivity to costs will help solve the problem of rising health care
costs.46 According to proponents, “imposing higher deductibles is the most
effective way to turn patients into consumers.”47 However, HDHPs represent a
potential solution for employers’ and insurers’ mutual interest in saving money
and shifting costs onto consumers so that instead of denying care to consumers,
“consumers deny care to their future selves as patients.”48 The question, then, is
whether consumers’ decisions to deny care to themselves results in cutting out
those medical services that are truly discretionary. The problem is that to answer
that question, policy makers would need to understand what is and is not
discretionary.
Here are some areas where cutting out care might be discretionary:
switching to lower cost providers, switching to lower cost drugs or technologies,
utilizing preventive measures, delaying or foregoing certain care that is not

46

See Jost & Hall, supra note 8 at 1, summarizing the arguments in favor of consumer driven health care.
For a series of essays promoting the benefits of consumer-driven health care, see Regina Herzlinger (Ed.),
Consumer-Driven Health Care: Implications for Providers, Payers, and Policymakers,” (2004).

47

Jost & Hall,supra note 8 at 1, note 7.

48

Mariner, supra note 4 at 541.
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medically necessary, avoiding care that is “experimental.”49 This may sound like
a familiar list because these are areas where managed care and even traditional
insurance historically have exercised control.50 While patients may have
challenged that control in particular instances, there is no reason to believe that
patients left to their own devices would do any better of a job than the managed
care plans have done.51
In fact, there is good evidence that consumers will do a worse job than
managed care in responding to financial incentives to avoid unnecessary care
because they will delay or forego care without making great distinctions and
choices between medically necessary and unnecessary care. 52 The choices will
impact most those with the least amount of money to spend.53 As a result, some
critics have referred to consumer financial incentives as a “blunt instrument.”54

49

See James Robinson, “Health Savings Accounts – The Ownership Society in Health Care,” N. Eng. J. of
Med. 353;12 (Sept. 22, 2005) 1199 at 1201.

50

Id.

51

Paul Feldstein, Thomas Wickizer, and John Wheeler, “Private Cost Containment: The Effects of
Utilization Review Programs on Health Care Use and Expenditures,” The New England Journal of
Medicine 1310 (Vol. 318, No. 20) (May 19, 1988) (finding favorable results in the use of utilization review
to reduce hospital admissions, cut down inpatient days, and save total medical expenditures); see also
Jacobi, “The Ends of Health Insurance,” 30 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 311, 381 (one critique of consumer driven
health care is that personal control of health expenditures is inconsistent with the structure of cost
containment through managed care, citing studies that have looked at the lack of control over costs once the
deductible is exhausted.)

52

For a detailed discussion of the problems with putting consumers in charge of these decisions based on
lack of skill and information, see Monahan, supra note 7 at 34-44. Note that there are some scholars who
are promoting the idea of combining HDHPs with managed care “to create synergies that should benefit
consumers and bring new cost-consciousness and discipline to the health care marketplace.” Hall &
Havighurst, supra note 15 at 1490.

53

See David Himmelstein, et al., supra note 36; Elizabeth Warren, “The Growing Threat to Middle Class
Families,” 69 Brooklyn L. Rev. 401, 416-420 (Winter 2004) (documenting the financial vulnerability
caused by medical expenses that threatens even the middle class).

54

Davis, “Consumer-Directed Health Care: Will It Improve Health System Performance?” Health Services
Research 39:4 Part II at 1230 (August 2004).
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According to a landmark study by the Rand Corporation,55 high deductibles have
“selective effects:” the most vulnerable patients are put at greatest risk.56
Because patients cannot effectively distinguish between care that is necessary
and that which is “discretionary,” the Rand study found that there were adverse
effects on health for lower-income and high-risk individuals.57
More recent studies have confirmed these results: Americans with higher
deductibles are significantly more likely than those with lower deductibles to
report difficulty obtaining needed care.58 According to a 2003 survey by the
Commonwealth Fund, 38% of individuals with deductibles of $1000 or more
reported at least one of four cost-related access problems: not filling a
prescription, not getting needed specialist care, skipping a recommended test or
follow-up exam, or having a medical problem but not visiting a doctor or clinic.59
A more recent survey (October 2005) conducted by the Employee Benefits
Research Institute and the Commonwealth Fund similarly found that individuals
with HDHPs were significantly more likely to avoid, skip, or delay care (about 1/3)
55

See Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz & Marquis, “Health Insurance and the Demand for
Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment,” The American Economic Review, June 1987
(pp. 251-277).

56

Arnold Relman, “The Health of Nations: Medicine and the Free Market,” The New Republic 23, 27
(March 7, 2005).

57

Davis, supra note 54 at 1221-1222: Davis notes a number of additional studies reviewing care for lowincome children and adults with particularly disturbing results of adverse health effects: significantly lower
chances of receiving effective services for acute conditions, receiving preventive care, and avoiding
inappropriate hospital admissions.

58

Davis, Doty, & Ho, “How High is Too High? Implications of High-Deductible Health Plans,” supra note
4 at 4.

59

Id. at 8. This is compared to 21% of individuals with no deductible; see also Fronstin & Collins, supra
note 3 at 15-17 (noting significant negative impacts among enrollees in HDHPs with a correlation between
enrollment and skipping or not filling medications).
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because of costs, with a more pronounced problem among people with incomes
below $50,000.60
Moreover, there is a total lack of reliable and understandable information
for consumers to use in making informed decisions about whether to incur
expenses or not.61 For example, there is little public information even for
providers to adopt “best practices” toward high performance, nor is there good
data to work from.62 In addition, few plans provide advice for patients who are
under-using services.63 Quality and cost information are almost non-existent.64

60

Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3 at 1.

61

Id. see also Davis, supra note 54 at 1228.

62

Statement of Charyl Damberg, Senior Policy Researcher, The RAND Corporation before the [California]
Department of Insurance (Sept. 20, 2005) at 9-11, noting the absence of reliable and consistent quality and
price data that is either collected or available.

63

Davis, “Consumer-Directed Health Care,” supra note 54 at 1227. See also Fronstin & Collins, supra note
3 at 19-21, noting a clear deficit of information about providers, even where more than 50% of enrollees in
HMOs attempted to access such information.

64

Davis, supra note 54 at 1228; see also RAND, “’Consumer-Directed’ Health Plans: Implications for
Health Care Quality and Cost,” supra note 28 at 17-18, describing a number of quality indicators (e.g.,
Leapfrong, and JCAHO standards) used by health plans to create tiers relating cost and quality and noting
that they are still too complex for either consumers or employers to utilize effectively, let alone result in
pressures toward cost-effectiveness; GAO Report, “Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: FirstYear Experience with High-Deductible Health Plans and Health Savings Accounts,” supra note 33 at 21
(January 2006) : “Enrollees [in HDHPs] need information to help them assess the cost and quality tradeoffs between different health care treatments and providers. However, the extent to which [HDHPs] made
such information available to enrollees was varied and limited … Most notably lacking was specific
information to assess the quality of health care provided by particular physicians and the actual prices plans
had negotiated with particular providers;” and Damon Darlin, “You Think 401(k)’s Are Hard to Manage?
Try Health Accounts,” The New York Times B5 (Feb. 18, 2006) (noting the basic lack of consumer
information to help individuals obtain price and quality information necessary to make choices).
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B. The Myth of Discretionary Income for Health Care Spending

As noted above, HDHPs negatively impact individuals with annual
incomes less than $50,000.65 Despite this disproportionate impact, no provisions
have been made to reduce the negative effects on this population. Most
employers offering plans with greater cost-sharing do not include reduced costsharing for lower-wage workers.66
An exhaustive study investigating consumer bankruptcies found a
substantial correlation with medical debt.67 One of the most eye-opening aspects
of this work was the finding that 75% of those suffering with medical debts and
declaring bankruptcy had insurance.68 These people can be referred to as the
“under-insured:” Although they have health insurance, they still cannot afford
their medical care. Individual examples have been documented in the media.69
In fact, only 10% of employees who have the option of setting aside funds in
Health Savings Accounts to save for their deductibles are actually putting money

65

Fronstin & Collins, supa note 3 at 1.

66

Davis, supra note 54 at 1222; and Pacific Business Group on Health, “Benefit Strategies to Promote
Quality, Value and Access in High Deductible Health Plans” (PBGH Board of Directors Retreat 2005
Summary) (suggesting that employers consider “income-specific adjustments” on the high deductible
option).

67

Himmelstein, Warren, et al., supra note 36 at 1.

68

Id.

69

John Leland, “When Even Health Insurance is No Safeguard,” supra note 37. See also Warren, “The
Growing Threat to Middle Class Families,” supra note 53, noting the increased vulnerability of working
Americans, and even families with both partners working, to medical debt.
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in their accounts,70 suggesting that they may not have the discretionary income
to save. This is particularly problematic for lower-income consumers because
the most recent studies show that 42% of those with HDHPs spent more than 5%
of their income on out-of-pocket costs, as compared to 17% of those in
comprehensive health plans.71 If they do not have the money to spend, the
driving force behind the consumer’s exercise of discretion will not be whether the
care is necessary but whether the consumer’s income is sufficient to cover the
bill.

C. The Myth of Consumer Power to Negotiate Over and Make an Impact
on the Costs of Health Care

It is estimated that only a small percentage of medical costs are due to
expenses driven by physician recommendations and that managed care’s
effectiveness has been, in part, to control these costs.72 Therefore, even if
consumers did just as good a job as managed care plans73 in negotiating over

70

Note that if they fund the savings accounts, those savings are theirs to keep, meaning that not funding the
savings accounts truly represents a lost opportunity to save money, in contrast to the prior Health
Reimbursement Arrangements where money not spent was lost. See Larson & Dettman, supra note 29 at
1101-1102.

71

Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3 at 1.

72

See Davis, Doty, and Ho, supra note 4 at 15-16 (total expenditures below the deductible account for only
21% of total health care spending). In fact, major contributors to health care inflation arise from costs not
driven by physicians, such as prescription drugs and hospital care. See, e.g., Bradley Strunk, et. al.
“Tracking Health Care Costs: Growth Accelerates Again in 2001,” http://www.ebri.org; Stephen Heffler,
et al., “Health Spending Projections for 2002-2012,” Health Affairs, http://www.healthaffairs.org.
73

There are multiple explanations for the reasons why managed care itself failed to achieve cost-savings
but critics remain skeptical that consumer driven health care can pick up the slack. See Jacobi, “After
Managed Care…”, supra note 44 at. 406: “Consumer-driven health plans have migrated far from the vision
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costs and reversing doctors’ incentives to drive up health care spending, the
impact would be modest. In fact, the great majority of total health care costs
(69%) is attributable to only 10% of the population, those who are terminally and
chronically ill.74 This population would most quickly exhaust their deductibles and
the incentives not to incur the deductibles would be lost quickly upon them.75
There is much to be skeptical about in the idea that consumers will
exercise some kind of bargaining power by “shopping around” and negotiating
price with a physician or any other provider.76 Indeed, there is a strong
ideological divide between those who believe that ordinary market concepts
apply to health care and those who do not.77 According to the October 2005
EBRI/Commonwealth Study, while consumers enrolled in HDHPs evidenced
more “cost-consciousness” by checking on prices and discussing treatment
options with their physicians, their efforts, sadly, did not drive down the actual

of managed care as an expert organizer of medical care. They are instead a reaction to the failings of
managed care, and they hold little promise of advancing social goals of cost control, increased access to
coverage and improvements in quality.”
74

Davis, supra note 54 at 1223.

75

Id.

76

See Uwe Reinhardt, “The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy,” Health
Affairs 2006: 26(1)57-69 (raising sharp criticisms of consumer-driven health care and its ability to
function as a meaningful control over health care costs, using the Byzantine structure of hospital charges as
an example where consumers could doubtfully exercise much influence).

77

For a highly developed critique of the market approach and policies aimed at promoting consumer costsharing, see Rice, supra note 44. See also Andre Hampton, supra note 42; Jacobi, “Consumer-Directed
Health Care and the Chronically Ill,” supra note 45 at 533 (“[Consumer driven health plans are] likely to
fail for two reasons. It will endanger the health and well-being of the chronically ill … and it will fail (as
did the managed care ‘revolution’) to contain costs.”); Relman, “The Health of Nations,” supra note 56; and
Malcolm Gladwell, “The Moral Hazard Myth,” The New Yorker (Aug. 29, 2005). Compare with Hall &
Havighurst, supra note 15 at 1493 (Nov./Dec. 2005) (articulating an argument for viewing consumer driven
health care as “progressive, pro-consumer advance over managed care” by giving patients “more control on
the micro level of spending on servicees….”)
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costs; instead, they simply chose to forego care.78 Even if a consumer could
negotiate price with a doctor over receiving a single service, it is highly unlikely
that this negotiation would exert any meaningful effect on the costs of future
services provided by that particular doctor should the patient to choose to form a
doctor-patient relationship, nor on more expensive treatment options, such as
diagnostics and hospital care over which that doctor would have minimal
control.79 In fact, some critics note that not only would consumers lack control
over negotiating price but the health care system as a whole would lose the
control necessary to institute quality of care improvements which requires
coordination and integration among related treatments and providers, a stark
contrast to the idea of consumers shopping around, service by service, amongst
a variety of competing and independent physicians.80

78

Fronstin & Collins, supra note 3 at 20-21.

79

See Monahan, supra note 7 at 49.

80

Relman, supra note 56 at 27: “[T]he Institute of Medicine’s recommendations about quality [could not]
be achieved if doctors and hospitals were expected to function as independent vendors do in ordinary
markets, simply responding to the demands of consumers. The essential task of coordination and
integration of services for each patient would be left to the patients themselves, and the uniform adoption of
modern information technology would be impossible. A fully developed CDHC [consumer driven health
care] market would be chaotic, to say the least, and in such a system continuity of care would be virtually
non-existent.” See also Alain Enthoven, “Employment-Based Health Insurance Is Failing: Now What?”
Health Affairs – Web Exclusive W3-237-249 (May 2003) where he criticizes consumer driven health care
for bringing back the “old model” of free choice, fee for service medicine which he criticizes for simply
shifting costs while avoiding “serious competition based on value for money” where cost-containment is
achieved by altering the fundamental way health care is organized and delivered; and Enthoven & Kronick,
supra note 43 at 31 (positing that the whole system never will realize efficiencies unless coverage is
universal because of the persistent problem of “cross-subsidizing” the uninsured).
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D. The myth of individual consumer choice and the risk of losing
affordable comprehensive health insurance

The fundamental problem is whether consumers actually have meaningful
choices about their health insurance. There are two fundamental constraints:
Can employers afford the premiums and can consumers afford the premiums?81
The majority of insured Americans are offered insurance at work and when they
are offered health insurance, there is no guarantee that they are offered a choice
of plans. Because employers pay the greater proportion of the health care
premiums, the choices, in large part, are determined by what the employer can
afford.82 Therefore, there is an incentive for the employers and the insurers to
offer products with lower premiums.83 HDHPs help answer that problem by
lowering the premiums because the employees take up a larger share of the cost
through the deductibles.84 Similarly, employees will be attracted to the lower
premiums; indeed, some employees will have no choice but to select plans with
the lower premiums because plans with higher premiums are increasingly
unaffordable.

As discussed above, a growing class of “uninsured” Americans

81

State and federal regulations also play an important role in determining the extent to which insurers are
required to accept applicants and the comprehensiveness of the coverage they are required to provide,
discussed infra in Section IV.

82

See Mariner, supra note 4 at 506: “Employment-based plans still give the employer the ultimate say in
which choices are available. There is some evidence that the majority of employers pay more attention to
the cost of premiums than to the quality of care or the operation of health plans.”

83

See generally, Gilmer & Kronick, supra note 32 (concluding that projected premium increases will
increase the number of uninsured Americans by 11 million in the next decade, from 45 million in 2003 to
56 million in 2013)
.
84
See generally, Gabel, et al., supra note 31at 117-126 (September/October 2003).
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are those who are offered insurance at work but decline the insurance because
they cannot afford the premiums.85 The financial pressure may lead them to opt
for HDHPs which can create great risks to health care consumers as individuals
and as a group.
On the individual level, the risks of being under-insured are particularly
acute for individuals with lower incomes and those with greater health care
needs. As discussed above, the result could be a clear adverse effect on their
health and on their financial status. However, there are further risks. As
consumers feel financial pressures to opt for HDHPs, the erosion of their health
insurance will lead them to forfeit key federal protections under “COBRA” and
“HIPAA.” Specifically, under COBRA,86 consumers who change jobs have the
option of retaining their health insurance but at 102% of the premium.87 This is
typically expensive. A much less expensive HDHP product marketed on the
individual market is likely to be more attractive even if it results in far greater
financial risk and even if it carries more limitations.88 However, individuals
moving to the individual market may not fully understand what they are giving up.
Under HIPAA’s “portability” protections, an individual cannot be excluded due to

85

Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, “The Uninsured: A Primer, Key Facts About
Americans Without Health Insurance,” Jan. 2006 (www.kff.org), at 13 (20% of uninsured workers had
health benefits offered to them but declined to participate).
86

29 U.S.C. § 1162.

87

Id. § 1162(3).

88

Similarly, “discount health plans” which are not even insurance products and in most states, not even
regulated by insurance agencies, may be attractive, leaving the field open for perpetrating a number of
fraudulent and misleading schemes on unknowing consumers. See Gerard Britton, “Discount Medical
Plans and the Consumer: Health Care in a Regulatory Blindspot,” 16 Loyola Consumer L. Rev. 97; and
Jost & Hall, supra note 8 at 401-402 (discussing the potential confusion resulting from such an interplay).
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pre-existing conditions from health insurance at a new employer89 as long as the
existing insurance was as comprehensive as that offered by the new employer.90
HIPAA legislative history indicates that deductibles can be used to determine the
comparative “comprehensiveness” of a health insurance product. 91 Therefore,
employers can circumvent the limitations on pre-existing condition exclusions
where there is a significant differential in deductibles. By opting for more bare
bones coverage and higher deductibles, consumers are putting themselves at
risk of being uninsurable. Sadly, this is undermining key incremental reforms
made to improve access to health insurance by limiting insurers from excluding
high risk individuals.92
The impact of these increased risks goes beyond the individual
consumers. First, any increase in unfunded medical debt will adversely effect
health care providers because they will suffer the financial strain of unpaid
medical bills.93 Second, HDHPs pose a pronounced problem of “risk

89

Under HIPAA, an individual with prior “creditable coverage” cannot be excluded for the amount of time
that the employee was previously covered; however, a new employer can provide insurance which excludes
an individual based on a pre-existing condition for up to 12 months if that individual does not have
“creditable coverage.” 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a).

90

29 U.S.C. § 1181(c)(3)(B): employers can elect to extend periods of exclusion where the level of
benefits is not consistent between plans.

91

See Conf. Rep. No. 736, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 181-182 (1996) (“[T]he inclusion versus exclusion of a
category of benefits such as pharmaceuticals could be considered a difference in classes of benefits.
Similarly significant differentials in deductibles could be considered differences in classes of benefits.”)

92

For a thoughtful and detailed discussion on the significance of COBRA and HIPAA protections in
requiring a greater “pooling of risks” and preventing harmful segmentation , see Jacobi, “The Ends of
Health Insurance,” supra note 51 at 366-387. Jacobi notes the irony of these reforms emerging at the time
that medical savings accounts were being promoted, explaining that the legislation emerged as a result of
compromise between two competing and conflicting visions on the role of the market and government to
address the “ends of health insurance.” Id. at 384-385.

93

See The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, supra note 41 at 9 (uncompensated care to
physicians is neither directly nor indirectly reimbursed by public dollars and even where hospitals are
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segmentation:” this refers to the phenomenon of younger, healthier individuals
gravitating toward the cheaper plans, leaving the older (which includes the
middle-aged) and chronically ill in the more comprehensive plans. The result is a
negative spiral (referred to as an “insurance death spiral”)94 whereby the
comprehensive plans cannot offset the higher risks of the older and sicker
members with the lower risks of the younger members, thereby raising the costs
in the more comprehensive plans.95 Those plans will become more and more
expensive, resulting in higher premiums and lower take-up rates, leaving more
people either without insurance or being financially pressured into selecting the
HDHPs with greater and perhaps unaffordable financial risk, again with the
potential for adverse health effects. The net result of these multiple individual
choices may be to drive comprehensive health plans out of the market and
increase the risks for everyone.

IV.

The Regulatory Vacuum

Unfortunately, there is an absence of a coherent regulatory response to
the problems raised above: a) how to protect individual consumers from making
bad choices about delaying or foregoing medically necessary care; b) how to

compensated, the extent to which the Medicaid and Medicare programs are cutting back on reimbursement
will result in a diminished willingness to care for the uninsured).
94

Mariner, supra note 4 at 511.

95

See Tollen, Ross, et al. supra note 39 at 1168: “If such segmentation occurs and plan sponsors do not
adjust their contributions to counteract it, premiums for comprehensive health insurance products could
become less affordable to the extent that those products primarily attract less-health employees.” See also
Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, supra note 51 at 380.
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protect individual consumers from the financial risks involved; and c) how to
protect consumers generally against undue “risk segmentation” and the potential
market forces which may lead to the dilution and ultimately, the elimination of
comprehensive health insurance as a choice.
Proponents of consumer-driven health care have argued that market
forces can help solve the public policy problem of inflationary health care
expenses.96 However, it is questionable whether ordinary contract law can
counter-balance the unequal bargaining power insurers and employers exercise
in determining consumer “choice.”97 The problem is that consumers exercise not
only a negligible degree of control over selecting their health insurance products,
but also over whether they even will be accepted or how the risks are pooled
(which can lead to how premiums are raised). “Market” control over those
aspects of the health insurance contract is exercised predominantly by
employers who actually have a conflict of interest between them and the
employees insofar as employers are interested in limiting their contributions to
the premiums and in shifting costs to the employees.98
Because health insurance contracts between insurers and insureds
generally are standardized “adhesion” contracts, individual consumers have very
little power to negotiate the specific terms, a problem which is exacerbated by the
96

For a summary of the legislative history, see Larson & Dettman, supra note 29 at 1107-1108. In this
article, Larson & Dettman note the irony of the fact that the HSAs are tax-subsidized was never
acknowledged as “distorting” the market. Id. at 1108-1109.

97

For an excellent analysis of the tensions raised by dually treating insured individuals as consumers and
patients and skepticism about the role of contract law in resolving such tensions, see Mariner, supra note 4.

98

See Kathy Cerminara, “Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal Aimed at Easing Tensions
and Resolving Conflict,” 33 Loy. U. Chic. L. J. 547, 570 (Spring 2002).
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degree of control exercised by employers in controlling the choices offered their
employees.99 Indeed, because insurance contracts are fundamentally nonnegotiable, some scholars have noted that the goal of insurance regulation is to
“remedy[] unfairness in insurance contracts.”100 Therefore, insurance law always
has represented a unique intersection of contract and regulatory law. While
contracts are used to define the relationship between the insured and the insurer,
state and federal regulation have been necessary to provide essential consumer
protections in the areas of preventing insolvencies, promoting actuarial
soundness, implementing policies related to the pooling of risks, and protecting
consumers from being excluded.101 Insurance regulation is fundamental to
protect the manner in which risks are spread over groups of individuals and it is
impossible for contracts between individual insurers to address the spreading of
such risks.102
In addition, outside of specific state and federal regulatory requirements,
legal theories based on civil rights and anti-discrimination claims aimed at
requiring inclusion of specific individuals or of specific services have provided

99

See generally, Mariner, supra note 4 at 522-523.

100

Id. at 524 note 112, citing Corbin.

101

See generally, Len Nichols and Linda Blumberg, “A Different Kind of ‘New Federalism’? The Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,” Health Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 at 25 (May/June
1998).

102

This is true even though there are basic ideological divides about the role of insurance in providing a
“social” good versus just a market good. See generally, Deborah Stone, “The Struggle for the Soul of
Health Insurance,” 18 Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law 287 (1993); Deborah Stone, “Beyond
Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity,” 6 Connecticut Insurance Law Journal 12 (Fall 1999); and
John Jacobi, “The Ends of Health Insurance,” supra note 92.
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only modest protections.103 Consumer protection, thus, depends on regulation
to address what in other markets might be considered market failures: the
unwieldy and potentially collusive power exercised by employers and insurers to
limit choices and exclude consumers from the market.104 Without such
regulation, the insurance products are at risk of being “diluted” over time.
Specifically, as discussed above, the market pressures to create affordable
premiums have led to HDHPs but they put consumers on an individual and
general level at risk.
The regulation of health insurance itself has always occupied a unique
status of being relegated predominantly to state regulation.105 Federal law,
however, has encroached in several ways. First, since the 1950s, Congress has
provided generous federal tax incentives for employer-based health insurance
which has resulted in a federal subsidy but this has not significantly encroached
on the state role.106 However, second, through ERISA, Congress and the courts
have laid the foundation for large employers who “self-insure” to make
themselves immune from any state attempts to regulate the insurance being

103

See Sharona Hoffman, “Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Care Coverage,” 78 Ind.
L. Rev. 659 (2003); Elizabeth Pendo, “The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing Coverage Exclusions a
Discrimnation,” 11 Conn. Ins. L. J. 293 (2004-2005); and Jacobi, “The Ends of Health Insurance,” supra
note 92.

104

See Jacobi, id.at 396-397 for a discussion on the role of regulations to adjust risks to prevent the type of
market failure described above.

105

It has been treated as a traditional state police power over health and safety and the state preeminence
was reinforced by federal law which left insurance regulation to the states. Jost & Hall, supra note 8 at
397-98.

106

Id. at 400.
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offered.107 Now, through HSAs, Congress has offered a tax incentive which
consumers only can enjoy if they choose HDHPs as their exclusive source of
coverage.108 This offers a unique experiment in a third type of federalism over
health care insofar as states are not required to take any action to authorize
HDHPs but neither are they prevented from regulating nor even prohibiting
them.109 In fact, the federal regulations only touch on a few aspects of the
structure of the HDHPs but otherwise leave a great deal of flexibility for state
regulation over the HDHPs themselves.110
The areas for potential state regulatory action fall into two categories: a)
the extent of state authority over HDHPs which are coupled with HSAs under the
federal law; 111 and b) the role of state authority over HDHPs that are not
marketed in conjunction with the federal tax incentives associated with HSAs.
As noted above, state authority over HDHPs offered by ERISA self-insured plans
is completely preempted.112 This paper will address generally areas for
regulatory guidance on both the state and federal levels.

107

Id. at 398-99. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
108

26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(1)(A).

109

Jost & Hall, supra note 8 at 400.

110

Note, however, that there is a contrast over regulation of HSAs insofar as they are administered by
banks which are regulated exclusively by federal law. Id. at 408.

111

Id. at 401-403, identifying a number of areas left open for state regulation with the introduction of
HDHPs coupled with HSAs; see also, Jacobi, “Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill,”
supra note 5 at 577-79.

112

Id. at 579, pointing out that despite ERISA’s preemption over self-insured plans, there is still potential
for state regulation of HSAs not administered by banks, opening a possible “back-door” to ERISA
preemption.
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V.

Formulating regulatory protections

A. Protecting individual consumers from making bad choices about delaying
or foregoing medically necessary care

1. Clarify and maximize the definition of preventive care
The place to begin is to make sure that individuals, even if concerned
about spending money out-of-pocket, are not deterred from obtaining preventive
care. As explained above, while federal law provides a “safe harbor” for HDHPs
to exclude preventive care from the deductible, the plans have discretion as to
whether they will actually provide for such an exclusion. In order to maximize the
benefit of the federal law, states should pass laws that requires HDHPs to
exclude all preventive care included under the federal definition113 so that it is not
left to the discretion of the plans. This protection should apply to all HDHPs,
whether or not they are linked to HSAs.
The federal definition, unfortunately, is limited because it excludes the
chronic care needs of individuals with on-going conditions; for example,
individuals with diabetes, hyper-tension, and asthma may actually avoid
unnecessary hospitalizations if their conditions are controlled but doctors’ visits
and medications necessary to control those conditions are not included.114
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26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(C); Internal Revenue Bulletin 2004-15 supra note 12.
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For example, an inhaler for someone with asthma would not be included, nor would regular visits to
treat hypertension and blood sugar problems.
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Extending the definition would be cost-effective and would benefit consumers by
helping them avoid unnecessary declines and adverse impacts on their health.115
Therefore, states should adopt a broader definition of preventive care for HDHPs
that are not offered in conjunction with HSAs to include health care services
necessary to control chronic conditions.
In addition, “case management” is a service that can help consumers,
particularly those with chronic care needs, navigate amongst a variety of health
care providers and under ideal conditions, promotes preventive and costeffective care.116 State law could include case management as a preventive
service that is excluded from the deductible amounts for HDHPs not offered in
conjunction with HSAs.

2. Provide consumers clear and prompt access to information so that
they understand what constitutes preventive care and if they are
not sure, a prompt process to answer specific questions

As discussed above, there are plentiful opportunities for consumers to
become confused about what expenses actually will qualify for the deductions
and which might be excluded because they constitute preventive care. First, if
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See Jacobi, “Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill,” supra note 45 at 576-77.
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See Arlene Luu and Brian Liang, “Case Management: Lessons Learned from Integrated Delivery to
Promote Quality Care to the Elderly,” 9 J. of Medicine & Law 257 (Summer 2005); see also Davis, supra
note 54 at 1 (noting studies that have found overutilization often is the result of provider decisions: about
one-fifth of sicker patients report receiving duplicate tests from different physicians, and medical records
and tests are not readily available to them – case management would be a benefit to both the consumer and
the insurer).
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they are in HMOs, the plans have discretion not to allow any out-of-pocket costs
incurred with respect to out-of-network providers to count toward the
deductibles.117 Second, even if such expenses might count toward the
deductibles, there are no applicable rules regarding whether a discounted rate
used by the plans for a similar service will create an upper limit on the
deductibles. Third, there are no legal requirements placing clear duties on
HDHPs with respect to informing consumers about which expenses count. Most
plans, now, provide explanation of benefit forms which indicate what counts
toward a deductible but these are always retrospective. That means that
consumers who are concerned about whether to incur an expense but are not
sure whether it will count toward the deductible, or how much of it will count,
have no legal right to an answer to that question prior to incurring the cost.
To address these problems, there should be legislation that requires plans
to inform consumers about which expenses count toward the deductible at three
junctures: a) in the information describing benefits; b) following any encounter
with the health care system; and c) upon a consumer’s request prior to accessing
services. Most health insurance plans utilize some types of prospective review;
this would be a matter of extending the opportunities for consumer education by
providing consumers with a right to access such prospective review procedures
themselves.
Legislation also should require plans to give consumers access to
information and staff to help them differentiate among “discretionary” and nondiscretionary health care spending with an emphasis on addressing: 1) not filling
117

26 U.S.C. § 223(b)(2)(B); Internal Revenue Bulletin 2004-2, supra note 9.
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prescriptions; 2) not getting specialist care; 3) skipping a recommended test or
follow-up exam; and 4) not visiting a doctor or clinic over a medical problem.
Plans should be required to reach out to consumers and make available
counseling to guide them if they are having any of the above problems.

3. Collect data and analyze the extent of preventable hospitalizations,
correlate to insurance products and the extent to which care was
not accessed due to unused deductible

As discussed above, there already is a high correlation between HDHPs
and consumers who delay or forego necessary care due to concerns about
costs. Legislation could be passed which requires the collection and analysis of
data to help determine whether cost-related access problems are emerging and
causing preventable hospitalizations. Data should determine whether there is a
correlation between preventable hospitalizations and the types of insurance
products with a specific focus on the impact of HDHPs.
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B. Protecting individual consumers from the financial risks involved

1. Set maximum limits on the deductibles

On the HDHPs offered with HSAs, states cannot interfere with the federal
minimums but can set maximums lower than the federal levels.118 On the
HDHPs offered without HSAs, states should set maximum levels. As opposed to
federal law, most states have no laws limiting the maximum amounts. The
question is where to set the maximums. Studies have shown that individuals
with annual incomes below $50,000 are most vulnerable.119 Legislation could
require on-going evaluation of the affordability of the deductibles based on
income level. However, for the time being, the maximums should be set at a
level that protects individuals below this income level.
In addition, federal legislation could require employers to fund HSAs for
individuals with incomes below $50,000. Similarly, state law also could require
employers that are not covered by ERISA to fund HSAs for individuals with
incomes below $50,000.120 Note, however, that this protection is limited because
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The federal maximums are $5000 for individuals and $10,000 for families. 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(A).
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See supra note 37 which defines the under-insured as people with incomes below 200% of the federal
poverty level who spend more than 5% of their income on out-of-pocket medical costs and anyone else
who spends more than 10% of their income on out-of-pocket medical costs. This may be considered as a
benchmark for setting limits.
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Federal law requires employers to fund HSAs equally for all employees, thus prohibiting differential
treatment even if it were done to protect lower-income employees. See Internal Revenue Bulleting 2004-2,
supra note 9 at Answer to Q-32. See also Mark Hall, “Paying for What You Get, and Getting What You
Pay For: Legal Responses to Consumer-Driven Health Care,” (text accompanies by footnote 46)
forthcoming publication in Law and Contemporary Problems (discussing possibilities for promoting
progressive practices in insurance pricing).
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HDHPs that are marketed separate and apart from HSAs will impose deductibles
with no opportunity for tax-subsidized savings.
In order to protect individuals from financial peril, there is a good argument
that individuals below a certain income level should be exempt from spending
their deductibles on catastrophic care.121 State law could add this exemption
from the deductibles.

2. Set requirements on the expenses that count toward the
deductibles

Legislation could clarify which out-of-pocket expenses actually count
toward the deductible. These should include any out-of-pocket expenses
incurred that could be covered by the insurance plan, whether or not the
consumer used a network provider in the case of HMOs, or a preferred provider
in the case of PPOs.122 If utilization review (“UR”) procedures are to be used to
limit which expenses can count toward the deductibles, then they must be
available for prospective use by consumers who must have a clear
understanding and a prompt procedure to use to access the UR process.
If the HDHP negotiates discounts with providers, then legislation could
require that the negotiated rates can be used as a limit only if the consumer is
121

In South Africa, for example, experiments with consumer driven health care have allowed for “riders” to
exclude hospitalization, surgery, and chronic conditions from the deductible, the idea being that first dollar
coverage is necessary to cover spending that truly is “non-discretionary.” Monahan, supra note 7 at 25; see
also Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 43 at 33 (suggesting a “managed competition” approach that allows
only “small” copayments and deductibles for inpatient hospital services because patients have relatively
little influence over decisions about the use of such services).
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26 U.S.C. § 223(b)(2)(B); Internal Revenue Bulletin 2004-2, supra note 9 at Answer to Q-4.
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clearly informed before making payment, the consumer has clear and accurate
information about which providers are in the network, and the preferred providers
are prohibited from collecting amounts that exceed the negotiated rates.

3. Set limits on out-of-pocket maximums which take into
account the deductibles and the co-payments and costsharing.
As discussed above, the trend toward HDHPs is part of an on-going trend
to shift costs to consumers. Therefore, when looking at issues of affordability, it
is important to have a full view of consumers’ exposure to out-of-pocket costs.
These include the premiums as well as co-payments and cost-sharing beyond
the out-of-pocket costs incurred in order to meet the deductible. Legislation
could require that limits be set on the total out-of-pocket costs with a particular
emphasis on protecting the most financially vulnerable consumers and the
sickest. In addition, there are some states which are concerned with “illusory
benefits.” In California, for example, illusory benefits are defined as situations
where the premiums paid exceed a certain percentage of claims (a loss to claims
ratio).123 Such a definition should include the payments made not only for the
premiums but for the deductibles and the other forms of cost-sharing.
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See e.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 10291.5(b)(2).
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C. Protecting consumers from undue “risk segmentation” and against losing
comprehensive health insurance as a choice

The most important way to protect against “risk segmentation” is to set
limits on insurers’ opportunities to exclude individuals.124 Regulatory reforms
which prohibit such exclusions force insurers into the position of spreading risks
among their insurance products.125 The goal should be to retain access to
comprehensive health care coverage as a viable option.126 In order to prevent a
cycle where comprehensive health insurance becomes utilized only by the
sickest individuals and thus becomes unaffordable (called “adverse selection”),
legislation can require insurers to absorb these risks by requiring them to offer
“low-deductible” health insurance products,127 even if they offer HDHPs.128
Therefore, legislation should: a) require insurers to provide employers a choice
of a non-HDHP with HDHPs; b) require employers to offer employees a choice
of a non-HDHP with HDHPs; and c) require insurers marketing in the individual
market to offer a choice of non-HDHP with HDHP. These products should be
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See Jacobi, “The Ends of Health Insurance,” supra note 51 at 379-81.
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Id.
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See Relman, supra note 56 at 28, noting insurance is rife with the potential for “market failures” where
due to competition among insurers, individuals lose access to the market and the market, left to unfettered
competition, has the potential to “dilute” the products available; and Davis, “’Consumer-Directed’ Health
Care: Will It Improve Health System Performance?,” supra note 54 at 1227 (noting that without risk
adjustment, sicker and lower-income individuals will pay higher premiums, and HMOs may eventually
cease to exist as unfavorable risk selection worsens).
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These could be defined as insurance products with deductibles below the minimum allowed by law to
meet the definition of an HDHP.
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See Jost & Hall, supra note 8 at 412-413, discussing possible ways that both employers and insurers can
spread risks across products and the potential role of regulation in ensuring that takes place.
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required to keep the difference in premiums within a manageable range so that
insurers will have an incentive to spread risks broadly within and amongst
products. In addition, on a related front, legislation should require HDHPs to
offer comprehensive health care, i.e., stop allowing HDHPs to limit access to
basic health care services such as maternity care, doctor’s visits, or hospital care
that is medically necessary.
As discussed above, states need to be concerned about the negative
impact HDHPs that are not required to offer comprehensive health care will have
on COBRA and HIPAA protections. Specifically, individuals with differentials in
coverage or deductibles will not have the same “creditable coverage” to prevent
pre-existing condition exclusions. The federal government or the states could
protect such individuals by: a) creating a “HIPAA”-like portability protection for
anyone moving from an HDHP to a comprehensive health insurance product;
and b) requiring a “HIPAA”-like portability protection which prohibits exclusions
based on differentials in deductible amounts. Note that under federal law, states
are permitted to be more protective of consumers than the federal law (a
“reverse” pre-emption clause).129

VI.

Conclusion
HDHPs offer nothing more than a temporary band-aid, at best, and at

worst, a misguided and unfortunate burden on consumers in the name of curbing
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42 U.S.C. § 300gg-23.

39

the amounts of money spent on health care without tackling cost-containment in
a meaningful way. We are only forestalling the inevitable which is a more
meaningful dialogue about the role of insurers in spreading risks and the role of
policy-makers in controlling costs. My personal preference would be not to allow
these products at all. However, short of a prohibition there must be protections.
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